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I. Contemporary Issues in Japan’s Commercial Dispute 
Processing  
 
Japan is currently faced with a wave of ‘globalization,’ which should be seen 
as the third wave of massive law reforms following the Meiji modernization and the 
post-war democratization.
1
 Globalization of the Japanese economy means that it has 
outgrown the traditional ‘system’
2
 and now requires a new system that reflects global 
standards. Japanese business and commercial activities, whether in or out of Japan, 
will inevitably include more cross-border commercial disputes. The current method of 
commercial dispute processing must be reviewed in the light of globalization. It was 
severely criticized as a barrier to trade and listed as one of the items to be discussed at 
the US-Japan Structural Impediment Initiatives in 1992.
3
 Transparent and 
accountable systems, including a dispute processing mechanism, have been demanded 
not only by foreign governments but also by the maturing Japanese economy itself. 
Japan has again justified its structural reform on the grounds of compliance with 
foreign pressure. 
 
Contemporary issues regarding Japanese commercial dispute processing are 
analytically summarized below. In the light of global standards, access to justice both 
                                                 
* Professor, Graduate School of International Development, Nagoya University. 
1 The historical evaluation of Meiji modernization and post-war democratization is debatable. The 
author believes that these are both revolutionary events based on internal demands and catalysed by 
foreign pressure. The current campaign for massive reform is also as a result of pressure from 
foreign investors in the light of the recent Japanese financial crisis following the collapse of the 
‘bubble’ economy and the subsequent Asian financial crisis due to a similar cause. 
2 K. van Wolferen (1989) p. 43. 
3 Second annual report dated 30 July 1992. 
in terms of quantity (availability of lawyers) and quality (natural justice) is 
substandard. 
 
1. Availability of lawyers 
Until recently the judiciary had been kept small as a tacit industrial policy. 
Commercial disputes have been controlled well by the bureaucracy through 
administrative guidance – wielding supervisory power through business associations 
and company groups. This tacit policy is reflected in a dearth of practising lawyers
（bengoshi）and judges as well as the extremely small budget for legal aid. Inadequate 
access to bengoshi is aggravated by a bengoshi monopoly on legal practice, including 
civil and commercial dispute processing, under Article 72 of the Law on Bengoshi. 
 
Furthermore, Article 30 of the Law on Bengoshi prohibits bengoshi from 
working for the business sector as in-house counsel and from holding any post in the 
bureaucracy. This segregation was intended to ensure the independence of bengoshi 
as legal professionals. However, it is obvious that this provision is now outdated and 
is a major obstacle to enhancing the transparency and accountability of business 
activities and public services under the rule of law. This provision has two negative 
implications: on the one hand, in a vicious circle, bengoshi have not realized that 
disputes relating to business or bureaucracy are their concern unless they are 
consulted for litigation in court; and on the other hand, neither large business 
corporations nor the bureaucracy has ever relied on bengoshi, who are mostly ignorant 
of business, until they believe litigation is inevitable even though it may involve 
sacrificing their reputation. 
 
Consequently, people and companies have been dependent on the bureaucracy. 
Where administrative dispute processing is not available, they even resort to hiring 
racketeers to deal with civil and commercial disputes. Alternatively, they simply 
avoid disputes. Avoidance might have been the most reasonable solution for 
commercial disputes from an economic point of view during the period of high-speed 
economic growth. This phenomenon is shown by the sharp decline in the number of 
ordinary litigation cases received by the courts of first instance between 1985 and 
1990 and the sharp increase from 1990 to 1995, a trend which coincides with the 
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growing ‘bubble’ economy from the mid 1980s until it ‘burst’ in the mid 1990s. Thus, 
the aversion to litigation was long ignored by the government until the adoption of the 
1998 Civil Procedure Reform.
4
 The capacity of the judiciary, including the 
availability of lawyers and legal aid, was not addressed by the civil procedure reform. 
It was left for the ongoing judicial reform initiatives. 
 
Along with the deregulation campaign under the recent administrative and 
judicial reforms and the Tokyo Big Bang initiatives, appropriate legal aid has recently 
been demanded and the Law on Legal Aid was finally enacted on 28 April 2000 and 
came into force on 1 October 2000. On 12 June 2001, the Justice System Reform 
Council attached to the Cabinet issued recommendations regarding the reform of the 
whole judicial system to increase its size and capacity as well as improve its quality, 
so that it could deal with an expected increase in the number and complexity of civil 
and commercial disputes. For this purpose, it recommended introduction of some 
features of the common-law style judicial system, such as a law school system 
emulating that in the US and the participation of citizens in jury trials, as well as the 
strengthening of legal aid. It proposed lifting the prohibition of bengoshi from 
working for the business sector as in-house counsel and from holding any post in the 
bureaucracy in Article 30 of the Law on Bengoshi. It also addressed reviewing the 
bengoshi monopoly of legal practice stipulated in Article 72.
5
  This issue relates to a 
more fundamental or philosophical issue on legal practice, that is, natural justice. 
 
2. Natural justice 
After the war, Japan partially adopted the adversary system: it introduced, for 
example, procedures based on the principle of party autonomy and procedures for the 
cross-examination of witnesses. However, as in the practice of settlement-in-litigation, 
the paternalistic practices of courts and judges still continue. In particular, as is seen 
in the practice of argument-and-settlement, the judge is assumed to be an inalienable 
professional who is a disinterested authority seeking truth and justice. As a wise man, 
the judge is also expected to persuade the parties to accept the most appropriate terms 
of settlement. The judge’s persuasive power is backed by his decision-making power 
                                                 
 
4 The new Code of Civil Procedure in 1996 came into force on 1 January 1998. 
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and state authority. Élitism, supported by the rank-conscious mentality of the people, 
underlies confidence in the judge and the court. This sentiment is shared by bengoshi, 
who also consist of a class of legal élite exclusively licensed by the state by means of 
Article 72 of the Law on Bengoshi. In this context, substantive justice has been sought 
by the court without due care for procedural justice. The fairness of the procedure has 
hardly ever been questioned since people’s confidence in the fairness of state 
authority has generally convinced them that a court decision or proposal is fair and 
thus brings justice. Ideas of natural justice or due process have largely been alien 
ideas imported after the war. Thus, using Damaska’s categorization of ‘ideal types,’ 
the Japanese civil practice would, in contrast to the English one, fall under 
‘inquisitorial’ procedure by a ‘hierarchical’ authority in a ‘managerial’ state. 
 
However, as discussed above, the mature economy has outgrown the 
government’s control and regulation of economic activities. Foreign investors have 
demanded freer markets and more open competition in the context of globalization of 
free-market economies. Learning from the recent financial crisis following the 
bursting of the bubble economy in Japan, Japanese financial circles have also 
demanded deregulation of economic activities. Significant changes are under way. 
The model of a vertical society under a paternalistic state is gradually being 
transformed into a horizontal and flat society with a self-reliant, responsible private 
sector. Power is shifting from the state bodies to private entities. Closed communities 
are being restructured into open forums while the monoculture is now starting to 
accept cultural diversity. These social changes are also influencing civil justice and 
dispute processing. As the people’s confidence starts to fade in the state authorities – 
in particular the courts – with regards to dispensing of substantive justice, procedural 
justice becomes appreciated as the only way to persuade people to reach fair solutions 
to disputes. The concept of fairness is increasingly being applied to procedural justice 
in the context of further globalization of commercial activities and dispute processing 
arising therefrom. What, then, is globalization?  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
5 See JSRC’s recommendations issued on 12 June 2001. 
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II. Cultural conflicts in global commercial dispute processing 
 
Not only in Japan, but in almost all other advanced countries as well, business 
and commerce are now conducted beyond national boundaries. Particularly after the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the capitalist economy entered a new era of 
free-market global economy. However, no global law or procedure has yet been 
realized. International commercial arbitration is developing as a viable way to process 
cross-border commercial disputes mainly because of its neutrality of jurisdiction and 
its enforceability through the New York Convention, as well as the efforts towards 
harmonizing domestic arbitration laws along the lines of the UNCITRAL Model Law 
on International Commercial Arbitration. Arbitration may provide the common 
framework for dispute processing. However, even the very concept of arbitration can 
be differently interpreted by each culture, and it cannot address the cultural conflicts 
behind the dispute. 
 
Japan, together with China and other East Asian countries influenced by 
Confucian philosophy, has a conciliatory culture in which mediation or conciliation 
has long been a preferred mechanism for dispute processing. This culture is in sharp 
contrast to the Western adversarial culture based on individualism, which views 
conflict and dispute positively. Here, rules are devised for fair play in processing 
disputes, to actualize individual rights. In particular, under common law theory, the 
substantive law providing for rights is found by the courts and crystallized in 
adjective law. Thus, procedural justice, called either due process or natural justice, is 
considered to be of universal value. 
 
Globalization of the free-market economy seems mostly to advance 
common-law driven Western dispute processing as the global standard, since the 
free-market system entails adversarial dispute processing. The recent Asian financial 
crisis has accelerated significant structural reforms, including law reform, in Asian 
countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam. In particular, assisted 
by international organizations and bilateral cooperation agencies – mostly dominated 
by common law lawyers – massive laws consistent with free-market principles, such 
as transparency and accountability, have been introduced for the sound development 
of the economy. Commercial dispute processing, whether domestic or international, is 
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a prioritized area of such legal reform to enhance free-market systems based on 
arms-length human relationships. As Weber’s rationality theory for capitalism 
suggests, dispute processing must here ultimately provide predictable binding 
decisions based on universal law applied to the facts found through due process. Thus, 
adversarial dispute processing underlying the rule of law is becoming the global 
standard. 
 
However, the efficiency of adversarial dispute processing, such as arbitration, 
is now being questioned. In order to ensure procedural fairness and uniformity in the 
application of the substantive law chosen by the parties, arbitration has, ironically, 
become inflexible, costly and time-consuming, like litigation. This is a paradox of 
modern litigious dispute processing. Thus, the mediation or conciliation typically 
found in the East Asian tradition have recently been taken up as alternatives or 
complements to the arbitration process – a pattern of ADR. Med-Arb and similar 
hybrid methods of dispute processing are developing as innovative ways to solve the 
problem of international arbitration. China,
6
 Hong Kong,
7
 Korea
8
 and Singapore
9
 
have formally adopted a system of conciliation within the framework of their 
arbitration. Not only these East Asian countries, but also dozens of other countries 
and jurisdictions, even including several common law jurisdictions
10
 have also 
incorporated settlement, mediation or conciliation, or a combination thereof, in the 
arbitration procedure. Common law jurisdictions’ traditional hostile attitude to 
conciliatory efforts by judges and arbitrators is changing.
11
 Accordingly, as can be 
seen in the contrast between the English and Japanese reforms in civil justice and 
arbitration, the adversarial and conciliatory cultures now seem to be converging on a 
possible global culture for better global dispute processing through comparative 
studies. 
                                                 
6 Article 41 of the Chinese Arbitration Law. 
7 Section 2B (3) of the Hong Kong Arbitration Ordinance (Amendment No.2 – 1989). 
8 The Korean Commercial Arbitration Board in Seoul endorses the combination of 
arbitration/conciliation (Tang H., ‘Is There an Expanding Culture that Favours Combining 
Arbitration with Conciliation or Other ADR Procedures?’ in Van Den Berg (1998), pp. 103–104). 
9 Section 17 of the Singapore 1994 International Arbitration Act. 
10 Ibid., pp. 103–108. Several US states inserted a set of rules regulating conciliation in their arbitration 
laws. According to Tang, India, Germany, Slovenia, Hungary, Former CMEA countries, Croatia, 
Austria, Australia, Canada, The Netherlands, Switzerland, France, the US, Latin America and WIPO 
have such a combination. 
11 B.M. Cremades (1998), p. 164. 
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 Such a global dispute culture cannot be developed without due care and 
respect for the local culture in each community. Each culture must learn from each 
other by means of such a cultural interface. It is clear from the Japanese experience 
that imported laws and systems need significant adaptation if they are to fit into 
indigenous institutions and local settings. The locality must be carefully examined and 
duly respected in order to create, not implant, appropriate laws and systems to best 
suit that locality.  
 
 
III. A Model for Comprehensive Dispute Processing 
 
What does the Japanese experience in dispute processing imply? The Japanese 
model of commercial dispute processing should be presented in order to bridge the 
cultural gaps between the conciliation culture represented by East Asia and the 
adversarial culture represented by Europe, England and the US. 
 
1. Old model 
The traditional Japanese model of civil and commercial dispute processing 
with third party involvement is a mixture of adjudication and conciliation in which the 
adjudicator also interchangeably played the role of conciliator. The decision maker 
usually attempted to seek some consensus from the parties. During the process of 
persuasion, however, he/she in fact often coerced them to accept the decision. The 
judge was expected to play the role of conciliator backed by his/her decision-making 
power in the civil procedure. Typically during rapid economic growth, economic 
bureaucrats who had the authority to supervise the disputing parties often controlled 
the dispute, mostly by means of non-binding administrative guidance. 
 
This paternalistic dispute processing may be called a model for mura (village 
community, or metaphorically, a closed human group or relationships). Mura can be 
seen in every corner of Japanese society – closed business communities in the form of 
business associations, company groups and keiretsu (lineage of companies) as well as 
the closed legal community of a professional élite protected by a bengoshi monopoly 
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of legal practice. In this model, the third party involvement in dispute processing as 
mediator and umpire protects the community’s common interests – harmony and 
peace of the mura. This old model is still largely valid in contemporary Japanese 
society, although Japan is currently seeking a new model, underlying the ongoing 
judicial reform. 
 
2. New model 
A new model of dispute processing must be compatible with global standards 
for a free-market economy. This may be defined as a party-controlled model. 
Although the third party’s role is still important, the third party participates in dispute 
processing not as a superior but as an equal partner subject to the party’s agreement. 
As masters of dispute processing, the parties control it with the assistance of lawyers, 
experts and the third party, who provide an opportunity for dialogue, expertise for the 
solution and safeguards for natural justice. Even in the case of litigation, the judge’s 
role as mediator should be clearly defined by the parties. The role of the third party 
must, however, also reflect the public interests, the interests of an open community or 
society. Any dispute concerns some community or society. Even cross-border 
commercial disputes concern the global community or society. The participation of 
this neutral representative of an open community is beneficial not only for guiding the 
parties to an equitable solution, but also for the voluntary execution of the settlement 
terms or its decision. 
 
In this sense, the idea of a ‘triangle’ consensus emerges where the neutral 
party has the support and confidence of the disputing parties. However, how can the 
old paternalistic processing be avoided in order to ensure the parties’ control over 
their own disputes? First, it is advisable to separate mediation/ conciliation procedures, 
in which a third party plays the role of a mediator/ conciliator for settlement, from 
those procedures for a binding decision. This clear separation also avoids the dilemma 
of choosing between the effectiveness of mediation/conciliation attempts and the 
integrity of arbitration and litigation. 
 
Nevertheless, the parties might prefer some hybrid processing for efficiency 
and credibility. Secondly, therefore, it is up to the parties to define the role of the 
neutral party and the appropriate procedures. Based on the agreement of the parties, 
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the third party could play multiple roles interchangeably – as mediator,
12
 conciliator, 
adjudicator,
13
 arbitrator or even judge. The role and overall procedures could be 
variously designed and tailor-made by the parties. Various combinations of 
techniques for mediation/conciliation and umpiring can be devised as in the 
conciliation-in-court procedures. However, there is the dilemma of hybrid procedures’ 
concerns about natural justice, and this dilemma must be carefully addressed by 
defining the neutral party’s role and the hybrid procedures. In the event that the 
arbitrator or the judge has played the role of mediator/conciliator, the right to rebut 
should not be sacrificed before resuming arbitration or litigation without the parties’ 
informed consent to this risk. The settlement should not be coerced in the name of 
persuasion. 
 
What is the difference between persuasion and coercion? It depends on who 
controls the dispute processing. Full disclosure of material information to the parties 
is essential to process a dispute under the control of the parties. The parties must be 
able to evaluate the settlement terms proposed by a conciliator, as it is crucial for their 
satisfaction that they can predict the result of rejecting or accepting the terms. No 
decision can be made without constraints, such as laws, customs, ethics, or even 
reputations, which define several choices. The point is whether the constraint is 
justifiable or not and who decides whether it is justifiable or not. 
 
Thus, thirdly, lawyers are still important actors as advisors. Their participation 
is necessary to set the parameters of what are justifiable choices and to address natural 
justice concerns to the parties. On the other hand, non-legal experts should also be 
encouraged to participate in the process since specific expertise is useful or crucial for 
processing certain types of disputes, for instance, over highly technical financial 
derivative products. 
 
                                                 
12 Here ‘mediator’ is defined as the informal facilitator of party negotiation while a ‘conciliator’ may 
be more actively involved by presenting a settlement proposal to the parties. 
13 Here ‘adjudicator’ is defined as the person who can render a certain decision, which is not final – an 
unbinding opinion or binding on an interim basis subject to the parties’ objection, such as 
adjudication in lieu of conciliation by the judge in the procedure of conciliation-in-court. In England, 
The Housing Grants, Construction and Regeneration Act 1996 (which came into force on 1 May 
1999) introduced mandatory adjudication, which is binding upon the parties on an interim basis. 
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 IV. New Paradigm: Comprehensive Dispute Processing 
 
Based on the new Japanese model, the concept of Comprehensive Dispute 
Processing (‘CDP’) may be proposed as a new paradigm for commercial dispute 
processing. The widely used concept of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) seems 
to have recently become inappropriate since in this paradigm mediation/ conciliation 
is defined as complementary to litigation. As argued by some contemporary 
commentators, this concept is too narrow to express the whole system of appropriate 
dispute processing for commercial disputes. For commercial dispute processing, 
non-confrontational dispute processing has recently become increasingly widely 
accepted as the principal method for processing a dispute while maintaining the 
business relationship. 
 
CDP seeks to create a consensus-centred dispute-processing network, linking 
and co-ordinating independent dispute processing procedures in various institutions as 
chosen by the parties. The procedures include mediation, conciliation, arbitration and 
hybrid procedures, such as Med-Arb. For instance, by using the networks for dispute 
processing prior to the emergence of a dispute, the parties may design their own 
tailor-made dispute processing as a preventive measure. 
 
Takeshi Kojima advocates a ‘total justice system’
14
 under which litigation is 
illustrated by the centre circle of a set of concentric circles, surrounded by the circle 
of arbitration and mediation/conciliation, which is, in turn, surrounded by the circle of 
administrative consultation, which is itself surrounded by the outer circle of 
negotiation for settlement. Within this system, he argues, there is interaction between 
these concentric circles; on the one hand, by the ‘ripple effect’ of formal judgments in 
the centre circle towards the outside circles of voluntary processing (the circle of 
administrative consultation and in turn the outermost circle of negotiation of 
settlement) and, on the other hand, by the ‘osmosis effect’ which in turn lets criteria 
used for the circles of voluntary processing become reflected in the standards for 
                                                 
14 T. Kojima, ‘Funsðshori Seido no Zentai Kðzð (The Whole Structure of the Dispute Processing 
System)’ in K. Shindð et al. (eds) (1984), p. 360. 
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judgments in the centre.
15
  Kojima argues that litigation is the centre of this system 
since it reflects justice. 
 
For lawyers, this model is easily understandable. Litigation should be of 
central importance to the total legal dispute processing system since it is the final 
resort (ultima ratio) and the ultimate coercive legal solution to disputes. Negotiation, 
mediation, conciliation and even arbitration cannot escape from the shadow of the law 
or the court’s decision, whether lawyers are involved or not. Thus, it is essential to 
improve access to civil justice in order to enhance CDP.  However, particularly 
regarding transnational commercial disputes, arbitration is another essential 
mechanism because it excludes the jurisdiction of a court in principle. International 
arbitration centres are becoming global courts beyond the limit of state courts and 
arbitration awards rendered therein are becoming more and more influential in 
practice. Furthermore, consensus-oriented dispute processing is of central importance 
in the designing of CDP in contracts for individual business transactions. During the 
21st century, international investors and traders will further develop such 
contract-based dispute processing. From the disputing parties’ point of view, as 
Bühring-Uhle rightly concludes,
16
 arbitration and even litigation can be re-defined as 
a complementary back-up procedure for a future-oriented polycentric voluntary 
solution for business. 
 
CDP is a single total open system consisting of continuous layers of 
processing. In this sense, CDP can be illustrated by an image of an inverted cone (see 
Figure 1 below). The top level (broad part of the cone) is the wide entrance of CDP 
occupied by the most non-confrontational process, such as negotiation. The middle 
layer (narrowing towards the apex) is occupied by mediation/ conciliation and a 
hybrid with confrontational processing, and finally the bottom (the apex of the 
inverted cone) is occupied by the most confrontational system of litigation and 
arbitration. 
                                                 
15 T. Kojima (1992), pp. 513–514. 
16 Bühring-Uhle (1996), pp. 393–394. 
 11
Figure 1. Image of CDP  
Litigation/Arbitration 
Mediation/Conciliation 
Negotiation 
 
From the point of view of disputing parties, this is a new paradigm for 
commercial dispute processing. For parties in commercial disputes, disputes normally 
come about during the course of their business, and in most cases, they will be solved 
in the course of business negotiation. If the dispute is more complicated, the parties 
will seek some help from a neutral third party to mediate or conciliate. Most 
commercial disputes will be processed and settled informally without referring to 
lawyers. Thus, commercial dispute processing should reflect the normal course of 
business practice and not be focused on the practice of lawyers. 
 
 
V. The Bar Associations’ Push for CDP 
 
1. Creation of a one-stop shop for dispute processing 
The idea of CDP should be articulated by bar associations in Japan as an 
appropriate means of dispute processing. A new model for CDP can be developed 
from the practice followed by the arbitration centres of the Japanese bar associations 
whereby the conciliator is appointed as arbitrator to decide unsettled issues within the 
specific scope entrusted to him/her by the parties, based on the confidence in the 
conciliator which has grown during the conciliation process. By clear specification of 
the entrusted scope by the parties, party autonomy and natural justice will be ensured 
since the result of arbitration within the scope is predictable. 
 
A network should be developed between the judiciary and independent ADR 
institutions. The initiatives of bar associations may bring about such a network. The 
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bar associations can be co-ordinators of CDP or serve as one-stop shops for dispute 
processing, providing various means of processing, and information about them. The 
one-stop shop may provide the link between the parties and their choices and the 
various procedures in different institutions, such as arbitration and conciliation 
services in the JCAA and the JSE and procedures in specialized institutions for 
disputes involving construction, intellectual property and financial products, i.e., 
securities and banking. The shop should also be linked with judicial processing. 
Without an arbitration agreement, mediation/ conciliation could be wasted since there 
is no power to impose any binding decision. Thus, litigation should be employed as a 
back-up for mediation/ conciliation. On the other hand, the court will also benefit 
from the linkage between the judiciary and independent ADR institutions, such as bar 
associations’ arbitration centres, because it will be able to refer the case to the 
institutions for mediation or conciliation before or during litigation proceedings 
without worrying about natural justice issues. 
 
2. Sound competition 
On the other hand, sound competition should be encouraged between the 
various types of processing in various institutions. Each system should be 
co-ordinated but not unified in order to allow for sound competition, which will 
improve the quality of the options available to the disputing parties as consumers. Bar 
associations’ arbitration centres will thus have to compete with innovative judicial 
procedures, such as the development of a specialized court and procedures for 
conciliation-in-court and the small claims. 
 
Again, for the promotion of such competition, the role of the bar associations 
is crucial as the professional bodies of bengoshi, who are the professionals of dispute 
processing. Articles 72 and 30 of the Law on Bengoshi should be reviewed with a 
view to liberalization through granting private business the right to perform dispute 
processing services and through granting bengoshi the right to work in the business 
and administration sectors to boost dispute processing capacity though self-regulatory 
business associations and administrative dispute processing. CDP covers not only 
civil justice, but also a wide range of dispute processing by business communities and 
administrative authorities. 
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